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1. Introduction 
This report summarizes the discussions and findings of the 2017 North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) Workshop, IST-153, on Cyber Resilience. The 
workshop was held in Munich, Germany, on 23–25 October 2017, at the University 
of Bundeswehr. This workshop was unclassified and open to NATO nations, 
Partner for Peace nations, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 
nations, and Global Partners. The workshop co-chairpersons were Dr Alexander 
Kott, US Army Research Laboratory, United States, and Prof Dr Gabrijela Dreo 
Rodosek, University of Bundeswehr, Germany. 
Committee members were Bob Madahar, Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratory, Cyber and Information Systems Division, United Kingdom; Emin 
Emrah Özsavaş, Turkish Army Cyber Defence, Turkey; Alfred Møller, Danish 
Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organization, Denmark; Harald Schmidt, 
Fraunhofer-Fkie, Germany; Dennis Mccallam, Northrop Grumman, United States; 
Peeter Lorents, Estonian IT College, Estonia; and Mark Raugas, Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory, United States. 
In organizing this workshop, the committee stressed that NATO nations—citizens, 
businesses, and governments—increasingly rely on cyber infrastructure. This puts 
national security at considerable risk to unforeseen and unknown cyber threats. The 
high level of interconnectivity found in modern society has opened many avenues 
for cyberattacks, including internal and external threats, and vulnerabilities within 
supply-chain networks. Despite continual progress in managing risks in the cyber 
domain, it is clear that anticipation and prevention of all possible attacks and 
malfunctions are not feasible for the current or future systems comprising the cyber 
infrastructure. Therefore, interest in cyber resilience (as opposed to merely risk-
based approaches) is increasing rapidly, in literature and in practice, with many 
nations expressing it in their cyber strategies.   
Resilience is defined in dictionaries as the ability to recover from or easily adjust 
to misfortune or change. It is characterized by 4 abilities: to plan/prepare, absorb, 
recover from, and adapt to known and unknown threats. Unlike concepts of risk or 
robustness—which are often and incorrectly conflated with resilience—resiliency 
refers to the system’s ability to recover or regenerate its performance to a sufficient 
level after an unexpected impact produces a degradation of its performance.  
However, the exact relation among resilience, risk, and robustness has not been 
well articulated technically. This includes the appropriateness and use of metrics, 
the correspondence to engineering and architectural approaches, and the role of 
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
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resilience-by-design in assuring effective recovery and continuity of operations. All 
these issues remain poorly researched and understood. 
For all these reasons, the workshop aimed to explore how the directions of current 
and future science and technology may impact and define potential breakthroughs 
in this field. The presentations and discussions at the workshop yielded this report. 
It focuses on the following topics that the participants of the workshop saw as 
particularly important: 
• fundamental properties of cyber resilience 
• approaches to measuring and modeling cyber resilience 
• mission modeling for cyber resilience 
• systems engineering for cyber resilience 
• dynamic defense as a path toward cyber resilience 
In addition, the papers presented at the workshop were published as a separate 
volume “Proceedings of the NATO IST-153/RWS-21 Workshop on Cyber 
Resilience,” edited by Alexander Kott and Gabi Dreo Rodosek, found online at 
http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2040/.  
2. Toward a Taxonomy of Fundamental System Properties of 
Cyber Resilience 
Authors: Benjamin Blakely, Diane Henshel, Gregory Wehner, and James Rowell 
Cyber resilience is an increasingly discussed but as yet not well-understood 
concept. Though progress has been made to distinguish it from cyber risk, an exact 
description of what makes a system resilient and how that resilience can be 
improved has yet to come. In this section, we build upon the work of Alexeev et al. 
(2017) to propose specific connections between well-known concepts of 
information assurance and the resilience of an information system to attack.  
We consider risk to be the probable consequence of threat actions (under the model 
of risk being the product of threat, vulnerability, and consequence), while resilience 
results in the minimization of the impact of threat actions and the enablement of 
recovery. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS 2008) risk lexicon 
defines these terms similarly, risk as “potential for an unwanted outcome resulting 
from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the 
associated consequences” and resilience as the “ability to resist, absorb, recover 
from, or successfully adapt to adversity or a change in conditions”. In a cyber 
context, we work from the assumption of compromise, famously put by John 
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
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Chambers, CEO of Cisco, as “there are 2 types of companies: those that have been 
hacked and those who don’t know they have been hacked.” 
Resilience has been extensively studied in other contexts, and some of those lessons 
have started to be applied to critical infrastructure. For example, in an ecological 
context (e.g., Holling [1973]), resilience is a property of a population that can be 
examined in terms of the properties of equilibria and oscillation given perturbations 
to the system. Similar thinking has been applied in economics (e.g., Briguglio et al. 
[2009]). The construction of buildings incorporates resilience properties to resist 
disasters (Cimellaro et al. 2016). Perhaps most relevant, this type of thinking has 
been applied to critical infrastructure protection (e.g., Watson [2015]) in an attempt 
to develop metrics for assessing the resilience of a system. 
To understand why a particular system is more resilient than another, we need to 
understand what properties of a system make it better able to resist, absorb, and 
recover in the face of an attack. Here we concern ourselves with intentional, 
malicious threat actors in the context of information technology systems. That 
system could come in many forms, however—from a single web server, to an 
interconnected system of microservices, to an embedded system as found in 
autonomous vehicles.  
Alexeev et al. (2017) analyzed resilience at several scales: micro, meso, and macro. 
We use these scales to categorize system properties that affect its resilience  
(Table 1). At the microscale, resilience is affected by individual component 
properties—whether they be software or hardware—and their interfaces with other 
components. At the mesoscale, architectural properties of the information system, 
organizational constraints, and operational requirements are used to define the 
critical resilience properties. At the macroscale, resilience is inherent in the 
properties of the mission to be carried out by the system(s) and assurance of its 
successful completion. 
Table 1 Resilience property domains 
Scale Domain 
Microscale Hardware and software (individual components) Interfaces 
Mesoscale Organizational constraints Operational requirements 
Macroscale Assurance of mission 
 
As we wish to focus on the ways systems can be better engineered versus the 
organization processes surrounding them, we primarily discuss structural 
resilience. Alexeev et al. (2017) distinguish between structural and active 
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
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resilience: structural resilience is the ability of a system to resist, absorb, or recover 
from an attack due to inherent properties in the way it is constructed. However, it 
is also worth touching on the topic of active resilience—the ability of a system to 
respond, adapt, and recover (Alexeev et al. 2017). We expect human intervention 
to provide most of the active resilience actions, but techniques such as moving 
target defense (MTD) could, in theory, restructure the system in a way that 
increases its resistance to existing, and perhaps future, attacks. 
We separate metrics—the measurement of the behavior of a system, typically in 
terms of how well it accomplishes its primary functionality—from fundamental 
properties. Metrics for resilience have been previously studied (e.g., Trimintzios 
[2011]), and there must be a tight coupling between fundamental properties and 
metrics. A physical system has properties that allow for prediction of its behavior 
under certain stresses. However, one would not confuse the spring constant of a 
particular spring with the metric of how fast the vehicle in which it is installed can 
go. While this may be an oversimplification, separating these 2 concepts allows us 
to focus on the resilience properties of a system irrespective of its specific purpose. 
Returning to Alexeev et al. (2017), we concur with the requirement that properties 
must be time-independent, quantifiable, and calculated rather than measured. 
Therefore, we propose the following mapping of categories of system properties to 
resilience objectives. For each, we give several examples of traditional information 
assurance concepts, or modifications of them, that might achieve the desired 
objective and may be an expression of a fundamental property of the system. From 
here, we conduct further research into how these, or other, concepts relate to the 
underlying properties of the system, how to quantify those properties, and how to 
use them to predict the response of a system to a given attack. Table 2 details the 
properties of such systems. 
Table 2 Properties of resilient systems 
 Resist Absorb Recover Respond 
Hardening Structural . . . . . . Active 
Diversity and modularity Structural, active . . . . . . Active 
Plasticity . . . Structural . . . Active 
Graceful degradation . . . Structural, active . . . . . . 
Instrumentation . . . Structural Structural Active 
Agility . . . Structural Structural, active Active 
 
A large part of information security, in the cyber domain, focuses on hardening 
systems to attack at the intersection of risk and resilience. If a system is properly 
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
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hardened, the vulnerability component of the risk equation is reduced, and thus the 
probability of a loss event is equivalently reduced, from a probabilistic standpoint. 
Likewise, if an outlier event occurs, a properly hardened system will be more 
resistant to an attacker who has penetrated or compromised it. Typically, this is 
referred to as “defense in depth” and has been the standard model of information 
security management for at least a decade. Concepts such as mandatory access 
control (whereby restrictions on even administrative users can be enforced at a 
granular level, e.g., Loscocco and Smalley [2001]) or Kerckhoff’s principle 
(whereby we assume an attacker has full knowledge of our system and we must 
maintain security regardless) start with the assumption that an attacker has already 
penetrated the system and look to mitigate damage. A related concept in light of 
the widespread impact of ransomware might be persistent access—the ability of an 
administrator to maintain control of a system despite the actions of a malicious 
actor. 
Similarly, we can resist the actions of a malicious actor by complicating the task of 
targeting the system. Diversity in system components and their construction (e.g., 
operating system, programming language, access channel) requires an attacker to 
formulate multiple attack strategies or be lucky enough to match their strategy to 
the component presented to them. MTD strategies are designed to increase system 
diversity. Modularity in a system allows for the reconfiguration and replacement of 
components without requiring changes to the interface between them, thus enabling 
greater diversity. Diversity typically creates a level of overhead for administrators 
and may not be appropriate for all situations. However, in complex modern systems 
built upon microservice models, interfaces are largely confined to Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) calls and the underlying details are easily abstracted, 
allowing diversity between components, if not within them. 
Plasticity and graceful degradation allow the system to bend without breaking. 
Concepts such as redundant components, excess processing or communication 
capacity, and avoidance of single points of failure are common ways to allow a 
system to absorb unexpected events while continuing to deliver at least a minimum 
acceptable level of service. This ability clearly benefits availability, but its effect 
on confidentiality and integrity is less certain. Graceful degradation is the concept 
that a system may be preconfigured with a set of progressively less functional states 
that represent acceptable tradeoffs between continued functionality and the 
assurance of security parameters. For example, it may be acceptable to proceed with 
an encrypted connection despite an invalid certification in certain circumstances, 
or even to fall through to entirely unencrypted communication, but only if 
predefined criteria are met. Building these considerations into a system represents 
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
6 
worst-case thinking, but may be appropriate for highly sensitive or critical 
functions. 
Finally, structural properties of the system, such as instrumentation, can improve 
the ability of the system’s active properties—its ability to recover fully or resiliently 
continue operations in a degraded but acceptable state. Previous categories were 
primarily structural; recovery is largely active but depends upon information, that 
is, adequate instrumentation and monitoring. From a structural perspective, 
building appropriate instrumentation into the system and monitoring this 
instrumentation with appropriate reports and alerts (e.g., security information event 
management tools or intrusion detection/prevention tools) provide information that 
enables quicker detection of an attack and easier investigation. Whether by manual 
or automated means, it is much easier to respond to an attack if the right information 
is available rather than being in the context of uncertainty. The speed with which a 
system can be repaired or reconstituted may also be affected by structural 
parameters. Systems built in an “infrastructure as code” paradigm (i.e., with a high 
level of automation and configuration management) will be much easier to return 
to normal operation than systems requiring a great deal of manual effort and trial 
and error. Having frequent backups of critical configuration and data likewise will 
allow for recovery to a recent known-good state. 
3. Cyber Resilience-by-Design 
Authors: Perri Nejib, Edward Yakabovicz, and Alfred Moller 
During the workshop, a cyber system security engineering concept for cyber 
resilience was introduced to the working group (Fig. 1). The Start Secure, Stay 
Secure, and Return Secure concept was mapped to the NATO Plan, Prepare, 
Absorb, Recover, and Adapt concept for cyber resiliency. This addresses the 
engineering-driven actions necessary to develop more resilient systems by 
integrating cybersecurity/systems security engineering (SSE) to that of the well-
known systems engineering (SE) process. This concept, shown in Fig. 1, infuses 
SSE techniques, methods, and practices into typical systems and software 
engineering system development lifecycle activities, thus becoming part of the core 
solution/process rather than an isolated and expensive add-on, bolt-on, and separate 
task/process.  
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
7 
 
Fig. 1 NATO cyber-resilience capabilities across the system lifecycle concept—based on 
Start Secure, Stay Secure, and Return Secure concept 
During the workshop, the group was also introduced to the Cyber Resiliency 
Engineering Framework developed by MITRE (Bodeau and Graubart 2011), which 
provides an overview of how to structure cyber-resiliency capabilities by 
addressing the goals, objectives, and practices in alignment with the “adversary 
activities” that occur within each capability to reflect the intent and potential actions 
that the capabilities are intended to protect.  
Figure 2 shows the cyber-resilience goals (top) and associated objectives (bottom) 
from the framework, which align closely with the NATO cyber-resiliency goals. It 
was apparent throughout the workshop that many of the cyber-resilience concepts 
presented and introduced were applicable in the NATO domain as well. The 
following section contains some additional insights that were gained in each of the 
goal areas during the workshop. It focuses on the architecture perspective as a 
starting point. Future workshops and papers can expand these data to include other 
views from engineering, process, and mission assurance perspectives. 
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
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Fig. 2 Cyber Resiliency Engineering Framework goals and objectives alignment with 
NATO cyber-resilience goals and objectives (Bodeau and Graubart 2011) 
3.1 Goal: Plan/Prepare 
For this goal, the architectural approach is reasonably understood and widely used 
for the design of systems. We have to prepare for cyber resilience by using well-
known architecture components, relations, and structures with redundancy, 
segmentation, diversity, monitoring, coordination, deception, and so on. We also 
have to be aware of the resilience of the information and communication 
technology (ICT) platform, because operations are highly dependent on the military 
platforms. 
However, the understanding of relations to operational procedures should be 
improved. This is prerequisite for having operational people adapt to changes of 
operations in order to complete a mission even with degraded system capabilities.  
3.2 Goal: Absorb 
The goal of absorbing may seem more difficult from an architectural point of view. 
Continuation of operations or mission assurance may require unforeseen 
changeability of the basic system architecture dependent on what is down or 
degraded by a cyberattack. However, not only the technical systems may require 
change, but also the operational procedures and way of exchanging information. 
The consequence may be that alternative communication and processing are 
necessary together with a change of operational procedures, thus resulting in 
different mission enterprise architectures, which may not be foreseen in the 
preparation phase. The result may be that new ways of handling architecture are 
needed in this dynamic environment.   
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Constraining the attack is often foreseen during the planning/preparation; however, 
unexpected ways of attacks may not be foreseen (i.e., some adaptations are needed 
to isolate faults). How can one use an architectural approach to support this goal of 
absorbing with limitations of damage, ensuring execution of essential parts of the 
mission, and understanding of the issues? This may require further investigation 
and research. 
3.3 Goal: Recover 
The end-state of recovering is normally supported by the architecture. However, 
transformation from an unexpected state to a recovered state while still maintaining 
operational continuity is not well understood either and may also require further 
investigations and research. 
3.4 Goal: Adapt 
The re-architecting phase is often the best understood part of the cyber-resilience 
architecture process, because it is “easy” to make modifications or reconfigurations 
based on earlier events or inject emerging technologies for improving the resilience. 
As shown in Table 3, we took the framework and again mapped NATO cyber-
resilience capabilities to it. We looked closely at the Cyber Resilience Engineering 
Framework concept and determined that it could be used to describe many of the 
NATO resiliency attributes, especially taking into account the interdependency 
among engineering, architecture, and operation/mission. Beyond capabilities, 
Table 3 also reflects the associated “adversary activities” that occur within each 
capability that reflect the intent and potential actions from which the capabilities 
are intended to protect.  
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Table 3 Mapping of NATO cyber-resilience capabilities to the Cyber Resilience 
Engineering Framework 
 
 
This section has summarized some of the key findings and discussion points that 
were a result of the collaboration and exchange during the NATO IST-153 Cyber 
Resilience Workshop. The table and mapping to the Cyber Resiliency Engineering 
Framework and the Start Secure, Stay Secure, and Return Secure concept are an 
excellent starting point toward further development of a NATO cyber resilience-
by-design capability. 
Plan/Prepare (goal: 
anticipate)
Understand-Prepare-
Prevent
Enable dynamic reconfiguration and 
resource re-allocation, using Dynamic 
Representation and Substantiated 
Integrity mechanisms that accurately 
describe the system state
Enable dynamic reconstitution, using 
discovery and Substantiated Integrity 
mechanisms
Define interfaces with Analytic 
Monitoring to enable situational 
awareness of cyber resources and (as 
feasible) of the surrounding 
environment and of alternative 
processing / communications 
capabilities 
Define external interfaces to enable 
situational awareness of the 
surrounding environment and of 
alternative processing / 
communications capabilities.
     
Involves developing alternative cyber courses of 
action (CCoAs), and being prepared to respond. 
Define CCoAs that use externally provided I&W 
(e.g., DIB tips) Define CCoAs that include I&W 
thresholds and triggers, as well as damage 
assessments, using data provided by Analytic 
Monitoring Define CCoAs that take into 
consideration mission priorities and constraints 
on timing of changes
The adversary is preparing the 
cyber battlefield, seeking to 
establish a foothold or 
consolidate a presence in the 
information infrastructure. The 
adversary performs 
reconnaissance, 
weaponization, and delivery, 
and attempts 
exploitation/installation.
Absorb (goal: withstand)
Understand-Continue-
Constrain
Incorporate notification / coordination 
mechanisms to deconflict actions (e.g., 
reconfiguration, refresh, resource re-
allocation, isolation, failover, 
reconstitution) by cyber defenders and 
managers / administrators
Design for modularity, so that 
functional segments can be easily 
defined 
Design to separate critical from non-
critical data and processing Incorporate 
thin clients, secure browsers, and 
diskless nodes to minimize data 
Define mappings between the 
architecture and governance structures, 
so that those (functional roles and/or 
architectural components) whose 
decisions will affect sets of cyber 
resources are clearly identified
Define standards for modularity Provide 
guidance for defining segments to 
enable isolation 
Define standards for trusted, isolated 
enclaves (criteria or trade-off analyses 
for when physical separation is needed 
vs. when virtual enclaves suffice)
The primary focus is thus on maintaining minimal 
essential capabilities.
Define CCoAs that include coordination between 
cyber defenders and managers or administrators 
at different tiers or with different spans of 
control
Define CCoAs that isolate mission-essential from 
non-essential cyber resources
The adversary has established a 
foothold or consolidated a 
presence in the information 
infrastructure, and is using this 
to subvert the mission (disrupt, 
deceive, usurp) or compromise 
future missions (acquire 
information). The adversary 
performs command and control 
and actions to achieve 
objectives.
Recover (goal: recover)
Understand-Continue-
Reconstitute
Design for agility and interoperability, 
enabling cyber resources to be 
repurposed
Design for spare capacity and secure 
failover
Define criteria and trade-offs for 
realigning resources and functionality
Perform trade-off analyses for 
redundancy, diversity, and costs Provide 
alternate communications paths for 
reporting the results of Analytic 
Monitoring (including indications, 
warnings, and damage assessments)
When adversary activities are sufficiently 
contained or defeated, the process of recovering 
from the attack can begin.
Restoration can take the form of backward 
recovery, rolling back to a known acceptable 
state.
Update CCoAs based on lessons learned from 
incidents, changes to mission priorities and 
constraints
Define alternate or out-of-band communications 
/ processing paths identified and incorporated 
The adversary has 
demonstrated a presence in or 
had significant impacts on the 
information infrastructure, but 
adversary activities have 
receded or been curtailed to a 
tolerable level. The adversary 
performs maintenance, seeking 
to ensure future access.
Adapt (goal: evolve)
Understand-Transform-
Re-architect
Design for modularity and agility, so 
that cyber resources can be relocated, 
refreshed, and/or replaced
Define standards (criteria and/or trade-
offs) for technologies to be replicated, 
distributed, diversified and/or 
modularized to facilitate unpredictable 
location or usage patterns 
Define standards (criteria and trade-
offs) for mission user and cyber 
defender interfaces that conceal 
unpredictable behavior that is not 
relevant to doing their jobs
Environmental changes include changes to the 
threat environment, the system environment, 
and the technology environment.
Perform realistic exercises that include 
unpredictable behavior, to evaluate impacts on 
mission user and cyber defender effectiveness
Re-archtecting may include redesigning, re-
implementing, or replacing existing cyber 
resources – particularly with new technologies 
(innovation), and reconfiguring existing 
resources to provide new or different 
capabilities.
The adversary is preparing the 
cyber battlefield anew, and 
new adversaries are arising, 
seeking to establish a foothold 
or consolidate a presence in the 
information infrastructure. The 
adversary seeks intelligence 
about planned investments in 
and changes to the information 
infrastructure (reconnaissance), 
and may attack the supply chain 
(weaponization and delivery).
Adversary ActivitiesSystem Security Engineering Architecture Operations/Mission
Cyber Resilience 
Capabilities and Goals
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4. Measuring and Modeling Cyber Resilience 
Authors: Igor Linkov, Carmen Mas-Machuca, Janos Sztipanovits, Hugh Harney, 
Dennis Kergl, and Alexander Kott 
4.1 Challenges of Security in Cyber Domain and Need for 
Resilience 
Analysis, measuring, and modeling of complex systems should include physical, 
information, cognitive, and social domains (Kott and Abdelzaher 2014). Cyber 
systems operate within the information domain, as they provide support to mission 
execution at one end and link to specific operational alternatives at the other end. 
Generally, cyber systems include sensing, software, and hardware components 
within systems and networks. These components provide the ability to understand 
and perform the critical mission functions necessary to sustain operations. Figure 3 
outlines the cyber-resilience problem. 
 
Fig. 3 Cyber resilience is composed of sensing, hardware, and software networks, which 
collectively contribute to mission goals and military operations 
The challenges of assessing cybersecurity are related to the interconnected nature 
of each of the cyber domains and asymmetric threat space. With regard to 
traditional systems, military personnel can provide protection through the 
identification of system threats and vulnerabilities as well as system hardening 
against attacks. This approach is limited for more complex systems in which 
systems domains are interdependent and interconnected. The hardening of one 
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system component is insufficient to protect against the connected domains, which 
may result in cascading failures. Given that cyber systems are highly complex, 
improved methods must account for the interconnected nature of system domains, 
operations, and goals.  
The second challenge of cyber resilience pertains to the adaptive nature of the 
adversaries themselves. The hardening of system components is highly visible to 
adversaries who can identify hardened components and subsequently conduct 
alternative interventions. Thus, while hardening of conventional systems typically 
results in increased costs of conducting attacks against the network, adversaries of 
even complex cybersecurity networks can identify barriers and plan counterattacks 
against other vulnerable components. In the case of the virtual world, adversaries 
can quickly adapt to overcome system entry barriers at a low cost. Third, the 
temporal dimension of cyberattacks is short as attacks can be developed in seconds 
through automated processes and require responses that no longer rely only on 
human judgment. 
To overcome potential network adversaries, resilience ensures that system recovery 
occurs across each of the physical, information, cognitive, and social domains. 
Cyber resilience is required to minimize the asymmetric advantage of cyberattacks. 
To shift from focusing on hardening system components to comprehensive system 
recovery allows for efficient allocation of resources. It ensures that protection is 
implemented across all system domains and spatial components to deceive 
adversaries and ensure high levels of systems protection.  
4.2 Methods and Tools for Measuring Resilience 
Resilience is a new concept in the risk management field. Resilience tools and 
measures are continually revised to adequately address potential threats to varieties 
of systems. Figure 4 shows 2 primary resilience approaches that are currently 
described in the literature: metric based and model based. The core of metric-based 
approaches entails measures of individual properties of system components using 
quantitative metrics (e.g., number of antivirus measures, number of system users). 
While the metrics may or may not be directly related to resilience, metrics should 
relate to the basic features of resilience, such as the ability of the system to adapt to 
adversary attacks and systematically recover from disruption. The metrics are 
traditionally combined either through indices or visualized through dashboards; 
however, these tools do not necessarily allow for integration of mission goals or 
tradeoffs within contradictory mission objectives. Thus, a Resilience Matrix 
(Linkov et al. 2013) provides a more comprehensive approach through the 
classification of individual metrics based on system domains and temporal 
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evolution of response to threat (absorption, recovery, and adaptation). The 
Resilience Matrix is capable of integrating multiple metrics by allowing for 
individual metrics to be weighted through the systematic elicitation of judgment by 
commanders or analysts.  
The second resilience method entails a model-based approach that focuses on 
representing the real world and defining resilience using models. Modeling requires 
an understanding of the critical functions of a mission, the critical function 
thresholds, the temporal patterns of a system, and system memory and adaptation. 
Process modeling requires a thorough understanding of the physical mechanisms 
within a system to simulate event impacts and system recovery; process modeling 
can be difficult to construct and may be information-intensive. Alternatively, 
statistical approaches require a lot of data on system performance. Bayesian models 
combine features of process and statistical models. Network models require a 
presentation of the system as interconnected networks whose structure is dependent 
on the function of the system. The game-theoretical/agent-based approach focuses 
on the model performance of the system based on a limited set of rules defined by 
the modelers. Using these approaches, resilience can be defined. However, the 
utility of many advanced models is limited due to the data-intensive requirements. 
Network science is the most promising of the approaches described because the 
structure of the network can be assessed within the social, cognitive, information, 
and physical domains of a system.  
 
Fig. 4 Two primary approaches for resilience quantification that are currently described 
in the literature, including metric- and model-based approaches. Within each of these 
approaches, multiple tools have been developed to address resilience in systems. 
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4.3 Example of Measuring Risk and Resilience 
Both risk and resilience are important within cybersecurity applications. Risk is 
useful when the attack vector is known and the vulnerabilities within the system 
are well defined. Further, risk is useful in scenarios when the consequences of an 
attack have previously been experienced and are predictable for future threat 
scenarios. Risk assessment is useful for the identification of specific vulnerabilities 
affected by system threats. Risk management is useful for the minimization of 
threat vectors under well-defined threat scenarios. However, risk assessment and 
management are no longer useful in scenarios in which threats and vulnerabilities 
are not well defined. Adaptive adversaries will always find a way to find new 
strategies of attack not currently recognized among the wide range of defense 
mechanisms. Probability calculations consistent with risk assessment and 
management may not work in situations of low risk and high uncertainty.  
The close relation of risk and resilience has encouraged the research community to 
take the former as a first step toward the evaluation of resilience. In fact, a system 
that is able to diminish the risks, reduce the impact of attacks, and improve the 
response and recovery phase is likely to be more resilient to attacks—though it 
cannot be guaranteed. The uncertainty justifies why the differences between risk 
and resilience should be considered, despite their close relation.  
Generally, risk models are based on known threats. That is, risk models consider a 
defined set of failures, attacks, and vulnerabilities that are known for a particular 
system. Hence, the complete set of adversaries is expected to be well defined (e.g., 
likelihood to occur, point of impact, impact radius). The resilience models, on the 
other hand, are designed to be effective given both known and unknown potential 
threats. Resilience models assess the functions of a particular system to then 
identify the critical ones. Further, resilience models determine how to restore the 
performance of the system given an attack in a faster and more efficient way. The 
restoration of the performance, as shown in Fig. 5, can achieve a level that is lower 
than, equal to, or even higher than the system performance before the attack. The 
performance restoration does not have to be done at once, but stepwise. Hence, new 
parameters measuring the resilience should be defined based on the compromise 
between the level of performance and the time from the attack. These parameters 
are depicted in Fig. 6: 
• tip is the time to restore the initial performance,  
• tfp is the time to reach the final performance,  
• ∆p is the difference between the final and the initial performance (negative 
if the system is underperforming), and 
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• imp is the impact of the attack measured by the decrease of performance. 
 
Fig. 5 Possible resilience profiles: Dashed profiles have worse resilience than the 
continuous counterparts since it takes longer to restore performance. Comparing 
performance levels using colors, the green profile offers better performance than the original 
one, whereas the red profile does not reach the initial performance.  
 
Fig. 6 Metrics associated to the resilience profile: tip is the time to restore the initial 
performance, tfp is the time to reach the final performance, ∆p is the difference between the 
final and the initial performance (negative if the system is underperforming), and imp is the 
impact of the threat measured by the decrease of performance 
To develop an efficient resilience model, a detailed knowledge of the system is 
required, as well as an understanding of the relationships and dependencies with 
other systems.  
Let us consider a particular example of a communication network in a local area. 
Assume that, in this case, the communication is provided by different technologies: 
wireless and wired. The performance could be measured by the number of 
connections that could survive a particular threat (e.g., loss of power of several 
communication nodes). Once the attack occurs, several protection and restoration 
mechanisms are activated so that the maximum and/or the most prioritized 
connections can be restored. The different mechanisms against an attack with a 
particular imp could be compared in terms of the presented metrics: tip, tfp, and ∆p. 
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The concept described previously can also be applied to cyber-physical systems 
(CPS), where the overall goal is to make the integrated system resilient against 
cyberattacks, physical attacks, and their combination. To date, resilience of 
physical systems and cyber systems (including dominantly computation and 
communication platforms) have been considered as largely disjoint goals in 
systems engineering that are achieved by different means. In CPSs, where salient 
functionalities and performance measures emerge from the tight interaction of 
physical and computation process, this distinction is counterproductive. Resilience 
needs to be measured in terms of the impact of threats on performance as defined 
by the context of utilities and risks as they are linked to system vulnerabilities and 
resources of attackers.  
In transportation networks, for example, vehicle throughput can be measured as a 
performance indicator of the network. Besides the physical topology and 
characteristics of the road network, the throughput is directly influenced by the 
traffic control network implemented using cyber means: sensors (inductive loops 
or imaging), actuators (traffic lights and message boards), and control algorithms 
(computing nodes and communication networks). The traffic signal schedules are 
typically designed to maximize throughput and minimize congestion. The risk is 
manifested in whether attackers exploit cyber vulnerabilities, such as tampering 
with the schedule of traffic lights in multiple intersections so as to minimize the 
traffic network utility by maximizing congestion. To avoid detection, attackers may 
select only valid schedules. In this scenario, the metrics proposed in Fig. 6 can be 
applied in the following manner. 
Assume the initial performance of the traffic network, T, that is obtained by 
optimizing the traffic light schedules. A worst-case attacker that has a certain 
amount of resources can mount A attacks (including modification of traffic light 
schedules at most k intersections) simultaneously. The goal of the attacker is to 
select A such that the throughput T is minimized: minA [T(A)]. The impact of the 
attack can be expressed by the metrics: imp = (T(A)-T)/T, where A is the worst-case 
attack given the resources of the attacker. 
In this example, we can make the following observations: 
1) The dynamics of the attack characterizing the overall resilience are 
influenced by not only the cyber components (attacker strategy and control 
network design) but also by the full integrated system dynamics including 
that of the traffic network. 
2) The model of the scenario requires not only physical models of the traffic 
network but also detailed implementation models of the cyber components 
and detailed models of the attacks. 
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3) In dynamic attack scenarios, the full trajectory characterizing attack, 
impact, and recovery require also modeling the strategies of the attackers 
and defenders in the framework of the attacker-defender games. 
4.4 Conclusions 
While both risk and resilience methods aim to strengthen a system against potential 
threats, they have different foundations; therefore, quantification of risk and 
resilience should be approached differently. Risk assessment is focused on finding 
a specific asset or system component vulnerable to a known or assumed threat.  As 
the threats and vulnerabilities are known, it is possible to harden the system against 
these threats. Conversely, resilience models better account for the uncertain threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences. Critical functions of the system are identified, as 
well as how these functionalities are impacted by unknown or unpredictable threats. 
That is, resilience models aim to determine whether and how quickly a system’s 
critical functionalities can be restored given an unspecified event in order for the 
system to recover to a normal, functioning state.  
Cybersecurity networks are complex and interconnected networks in which known 
and unknown threats may impair the integrity of the system as a whole. If the 
structure of a network’s interconnections and critical functionalities is well 
understood, resilience models help simulate how each state of the network will be 
impacted by an attack and how cascading effects will influence the resilience of the 
whole system. While existing risk and resilience modeling approaches are 
implemented, advanced quantification tools should be further explored to develop 
a comprehensive understanding of how resilience modeling can help enhance cyber 
resilience.  
5. Mission Models for Cyber-Resilient Military 
Operations 
Authors: Steven Noel, Tim Dudman, Pierre Trepagnier, and Sowdagar Badesha 
5.1 Mission Models and Resilience 
In general, cyber resilience is a property of individual systems, system-of-systems, 
networks, or organizations (Bodeau and Graubart 2017). Understanding cyber risks 
is a key enabler for achieving appropriate levels of resilience. Because of rich 
interdependencies among all levels of military activities (operational, tactical, and 
strategic), cyber risk is not solely determined by individual hosts, vulnerabilities, 
events, mission functions, and so on. Rather, it is an emergent property that depends 
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on dependencies among entities at all levels of military command and operations. 
Another dimension of resilience is flexible system components that manage cyber 
risk by changing configuration and organizational stance, such as modifying 
boundaries as a reaction to attack, changing roles to meet dependency needs of 
downstream assets, or forming new communication channels. 
Because of the challenges and costs of assessing and improving resilience across a 
military organization, such activities should be aligned to specific mission 
requirements. There is a need to identify or discover the various elements that 
contribute to mission success, and how those elements depend upon each other. 
This includes 1) high-level mission objectives, 2) the operational tasks that help 
meet each objective, 3) the system functions that support each task, and 4) the cyber 
assets that enable each system function. Given the various operational threats and 
associated risks, such mission dependency models (e.g., graph-based) can guide 
remediation actions, determine appropriate system redundancies and service 
diversity, and so on (Noel and Jajodia 2014). Then, as situations involving a 
cyberattack unfold, mission models can help prioritize alerts, assess elevated 
mission risk, and understand options for responding to attacks (Musman and 
Agbolosu-Amison 2014; Noel et al. 2015, 2016). In terms of military doctrine, 
mission modeling should be considered part of Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlefield (HDA 2014). 
However, in the current state of practice, developing and continually maintaining 
mission models remains an expensive process. It might be appropriate to capture 
some higher-level elements of doctrine through manual efforts (Heinbockel et al. 
2016). But because of continual churn at more operational levels, this becomes 
untenable for lower-level mission elements, especially in tactical environments. As 
an example, manual methods for producing dependency models from mission 
threads are expensive and unrepeatable. While there has been some progress in 
automated methods for mission modeling (Musman 2017; Schulz et al. 2017), there 
has been relatively little work in this area for tactical environments. Thus, military 
personnel are continually challenged with understanding how cyberattacks can put 
missions at risk and impact performance. 
5.2 Resilience as a Time-Based Problem 
Resilience is inherently a time-based problem (Musman et al. 2013; Trepagnier and 
Schulz 2015). For example, maintaining operational tempo in cyberspace requires 
synchronizing ongoing analysis with incoming data (e.g., alert streams). At the 
other end of temporal relevance is the need for aging out data that are no longer 
relevant to the mission components being protected. Another requirement for cyber 
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resilience is to bring attention to situational changes of relevance to mission 
assurance, such as deviation from planned versus actual events. For example, such 
requirements can be addressed through dynamically changing mission-dependency 
graphs, with re-planning during live missions and activating alternate graph 
sections in response to events. A system like this could suggest changes that result 
in more resilient mission graphs (e.g., algorithms that run high impact/low 
probability analysis). 
5.3 Time-Based Dependencies 
Cyber resilience is quantified by the length of time necessary to recover from a 
perturbation. In this section, we explore another aspect of time dependence, in 
which the assets on which a mission depend themselves change over time. Let’s 
explore a toy example taken from the Munich public transportation authority: 
returning to the Munich airport after the IST-153 Cyber Resilience Workshop. For 
a specific taxonomy here, we stipulate “Get to the airport from University of the 
Bundeswehr” to be a sub-mission of the tactical mission “Attending the IST-153 
Cyber Resilience Workshop”, and that tactical mission to be part of the operational 
mission “My publications in 2017”, which in turn is part of the overarching 
strategic mission “My successful career in cybersecurity”. 
As shown in Fig. 7, the tactical sub-mission “Get to the airport from University of 
the Bundeswehr” contains a baseline course of action: Take Bus 199 from the 
University gate to the subway station, then take subway U-5 to the Ostbahnhof, and 
then take S-Bahn 8 from Ostbahnhof to the airport. At the baseline level, mission 
success depends on the successive availability of the Bus 199, U-5, and S-8 assets. 
Each of these could be considered as sub-sub-missions of “Get to the airport from 
University of the Bundeswehr”, which in turn is a sub-mission of our tactical 
mission “Attending the IST-153 Cyber Resilience Workshop”. 
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Fig. 7 “Get to the airport from University of the Bundeswehr” sub-mission 
Note that Alternative 1, “Taxi from the university”, provides resilience in case the 
bus or U-5 are unavailable, while Alternative 2, “Taxi in central Munich”, would 
apply in case one has made it to Ostbahnhof, but the S-8 is not available. 
The point to emphasize here is the time dependence of the supporting assets 
regarding their contribution to mission resilience and mission success. Once one 
makes it to the subway station, the mission dependency on Bus 199 drops out. 
Similarly, once at Ostbahnhof, U-5 dependency ceases, as does the contribution of 
Alternative 1 to mission resilience. 
5.4 Hierarchical Decomposition 
The previous discussion suggests a general principle: that, analytically, it makes 
sense to continue to decompose missions hierarchically until one gets to atomic 
units where asset dependence is constant over time. (In the sense that the Airport 
mission dependence on Bus 199 is constant from the moment one steps onto it until 
one alights at the subway station, and then vanishes.) 
We suggest that it also has implications for information filtering. The exact 
schedules, fares, and phone numbers that the Munich transportation authority has 
so helpfully provided in Fig. 7 become irrelevant once one has successfully made 
it to the airport, and need not be passed on up to the next higher level of abstraction. 
Similarly, the entire process of getting home would be unlikely to be included in a 
trip report discussing the tactical mission “Attending the IST-153 Cyber Resilience 
Workshop” and that tactical mission might get only a summary mention in the 
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operational mission “My publications in 2017”, which in turn is subsumed in one’s 
strategic mission “My successful career in cybersecurity”. Thus, one can avoid the 
drowning in data issue that would result in retaining the fact at all levels of 
abstraction that a 4-zone train ticket in Munich costs 11.20 Euros. 
5.5 Capability Gap 
Current methods for assessing mission dependency lack both the granularity and 
fidelity to apply the hierarchical decomposition approach discussed previously, and 
more particularly, the discovery of the level of granularity necessary to answer a 
specific question. Rather than being data-driven, they tend to rely on documentation 
and the memories and opinions of subject-matter experts. Given constant fixes and 
patches that occur in cyber, they tend to reflect some combination of the as-
designed and as-understood structure, rather than the structure that actually exists 
at any given time. Developing an accurate method of actually assessing the asset 
dependencies of a mission, particularly with respect to timescale, is currently a 
significant unmet need. 
5.6 Appropriate Modeling Abstractions 
When constructing mission models, the model modalities and levels of abstraction 
need to be matched to the operational use cases. Models need to be sufficiently 
expressive for answering the required analytic questions and communicating results 
within an organization. Indeed, as a key part of system resilience, the human 
element can be included for modeling decisions in response to cyber events. The 
level of detail needs to be appropriate for the echelon of command, along a 
spectrum from operational, tactical, and strategic decision making. An important 
research direction is to develop visual analytics and dashboards appropriate for 
different command levels. 
Mission models based on directed acyclic graphs are built with the Cyber 
Command System tool (MITRE 2017) and analyzed/visualized via the CyGraph 
tool (Heinbockel et al. 2016). This captures a hierarchy of dependencies (directed 
acyclic graph) among mission functions, the information needed for these 
functions, the services that provide the information, and the hosts on which the 
services reside. In this way, incorporating mission dependencies supports resilience 
by prioritizing exploitable paths that lead to mission-critical cyber assets (Musman 
and Agbolosu-Amison 2014). Cyber resiliency techniques via CyGraph (Noel et al. 
2017) are augmented through information on cyber threats, vulnerabilities, policies, 
and traffic patterns. 
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An alternative approach is to create mission models that link cyber assets to 
organizational business processes (Musman et al. 2013; Noel et al. 2015) 
employing Business Process Modeling Notation (Object Management Group 2011) 
integrated with network-attack and mission-dependency graphs. Mission process 
models have also been integrated with information infrastructure, with validation 
and reasoning provided via ontology language (Barreto et al. 2012). 
5.7 A Common Mission Modeling Language 
A key research direction is to develop standard taxonomy for inferring mission 
dependencies, risks, and impacts (including resilience parameters) based on 
empirical studies. For example, this might include inferring recovery time of assets 
through system complexity indicators (subcomponent count, number of 
frameworks, users assigned to that component or process), asset value (cost) 
impact, data requirements for assets, or the presence of redundancy. This research 
direction dovetails with other forms of cybersecurity standardization (Martin 2009). 
Furthermore, the results of mission resilience analysis need to be effectively 
communicated to commanders, integrated through standard tactical dashboards, 
and mapped to geographic location as appropriate.  
For assessing mission resilience to cyberattack and communicating analytic results 
to military commanders, a common mission modeling taxonomy and language are 
needed, which represent both mission vignettes and cyber entities. Standards such 
as Coalition Battle Management Language (C-BML) (NATO 2012) define 
information (orders, plans, reports, requests, etc.) that can be readily processed by 
command and control systems, simulation systems, or interfaces to automated 
forces. Serving as an interoperability standard based on Extensible Markup 
Language (SISO 2013), the focus of C-BML is to convey a commander’s intent. 
Other efforts (in both the US and UK) have focused more on developing a Cyber 
Mission Impact Assessment (CMIA) modeling standard for representing mission 
dependencies, risks, and impacts. 
There are currently 2 CMIA standards that both allow the mission impact of 
potential cyberattacks on large military sociotechnical systems of systems to be 
modeled: 
1) The US approach (Musman et al. 2013), developed by MITRE and based 
on BPMN, allows for explicit modeling of temporal resilience 
characteristics and information resources within a general-purpose 
approach that can compute measures of effectiveness at a mission level for 
specific categories of cyber impacts. This approach requires manual 
intervention to alter the mission model to reflect the cyber effect of the 
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incident and repeated runs of the simulation to reflect the normal variations 
in mission instances. 
2) The UK approach (Lang and Madahar 2017), developed by Dstl in 
collaboration with RJD Technology and based on the Unified Modeling 
Language (Object Mangement Group 2015), focuses on capturing networks 
of computer information system elements and defining mission device 
associations with critical mission components, termed operational 
technology (OT). Analysis scripts allow for the identification of highly 
connected (and therefore potentially critical) systems, potential attack paths 
between attack surfaces and critical systems, and the impact on business 
processes of a successful cyberattack. This approach was developed to 
support the analysis of individual military platforms and critical national 
infrastructure as part of cyber vulnerability investigations, and therefore 
requires an integration architecture to support analysis across multiple 
CMIA models to represent whole military deployments and cyber terrains. 
However, it does lend itself to the reuse of individual models to reduce the 
overall modeling burden. 
The question of how to present the analysis results to mission operators has not 
been addressed in either the UK or US CMIA programs, and in both cases, the 
outputs of the analysis are highly dependent on the skills and knowledge of the 
CMIA analyst and the availability and accuracy of the technical information used 
to construct the models. 
In the UK, the Joint User Cyber Mission Planning program (Waldock  et al. 2017) 
is developing a concept demonstrator to combine some of the previously mentioned 
modeling concepts with advanced cyberattack and mission impact assessment 
(MIA) analysis algorithms, to allow tactical military personnel to plan and conduct 
missions involving cyber operations. In addition, the latest user interaction and 
visualization technologies are being trialed to effectively capture a commander’s 
intent through a tactical map-based dashboard and communicate the results of 
analysis to military personnel at different levels. 
Mission vignettes and computer networks (including software and vulnerabilities) 
are being modeled as a unified, scalable connected property-graph, allowing 
mission dependencies and resilience parameters to be explicitly modeled at varying 
levels of detail (LODs), as well as the application of MIA methods designed to 
assess cyber resilience (Dudman et al. 2017). UK CMIA model interoperability is 
being integrated to support the automatic generation of mission vignettes 
composing OT (critical mission components) for previously modeled military 
systems. The vignette is augmented with mission objectives and effects as military 
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personnel interact with the variety of interfaces available to create and assess 
courses of action. Entire computer networks are imported separately from network 
information systems, so device associations are required to enable detailed 
automated cyber-resilience analysis. Joint military symbology (DOD 2014) has 
been extended to show the location of cyber entities (e.g., unknown entities, 
friendly defensive cyber sections, and hostile offensive cyber squads) in familiar 
NATO format. 
Further research is needed for the reuse of existing system models and extensions 
to existing symbology. Questions about improved modeling of the human element 
of a cyberattack and deriving detailed temporal resilience parameters in a tactical 
situation also need to be addressed. Any common mission modeling language must 
include the required elements to capture the commander’s intent, OT, mission 
dependencies, computer networks, resilience parameters, and the necessary 
analysis support, while minimizing information requirements in a tactical setting. 
The development of a unified CMIA modeling language could provide systems that 
utilize property-graph analysis techniques with detailed mission modeling system 
and effects templates at varying LODs, and also support advanced human-centric 
cyberattack and mission impact assessment techniques. Further research is also 
required into the LODs that would be required of such models to support the 
different levels of command. 
5.8 Summary and Conclusions 
In this section, we examined the role of mission models (e.g., mission-dependency 
graphs) for cyber resilience in military environments. Such models provide a 
framework that focuses resilience efforts on assuring missions and a mission-
centric context for situational understanding in the face of cyberattacks. In terms of 
strategic directions for future research and development, it is important to consider 
automated methods for building such dependency models, to help reduce costs. 
Because resilience in cyberspace is inherently a time-dependent problem, mission 
models need to incorporate the dynamic nature of mission dependencies and 
network environments. Furthermore, the modeling abstractions and LODs need to 
be driven by mission requirements. Standardization efforts in the area of mission 
models for cyber resilience can also help in reducing costs and improving modeling 
accuracy and consistency. 
  
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
25 
6. Dynamic Defense in a Cyber-Resilient System 
Authors: Nathaniel Evans, Luis Muñoz-González, Nandi Leslie, Donald W French, 
Donald Woodard, Kerry Krutilla, and Amanda Joyce 
To understand the cyber resilience of a CPS, we must consider the system’s 
operational responsibility, whether the engineered system can adapt to adversarial, 
heterogeneous environments and continue to perform as designed, how quickly the 
system can repair itself following a cyberattack, and what network security 
mechanisms exist that are adaptive and can serve as dynamic defenses for CPS 
entities. Uniform and static approaches are not useful for cyber resilience and risk 
assessments. Although the applications that run on a computer host or networked 
device operate as a series of straightforward steps, the interaction between these 
applications and hardware components can lead to complex performance dynamics 
(Mytkowicz et al. 2009). For example, even though identical code is run on Intel 
Pentium 4-based and Intel Core2-based computers, the Intel Pentium 4-based 
computer can exhibit periodic cache-miss behavior; while aperiodic, and 
potentially chaotic, behavior is observed for the Intel Core 2-based computer (Berry 
et al. 2006). Both of these processors have the same ISA specifications and 
manufacturer.   
Cyber systems (e.g., intrusion prevention systems, intrusion detection systems 
[IDSs]) often are not scalable to cope with the size of networked devices, when 
considering all the components simultaneously in the system—this especially holds 
for lightweight, wearable devices in an Internet of Things (IoT) and large modern 
infrastructures of CPSs or industrial IoT. On the other hand, frequent changes in 
the system require the re-computation of the analyses from scratch, which is 
impractical and computationally expensive (or intractable) in many cases. There 
are a number of computational modeling techniques that can be useful to address 
the CPS security dynamics at multiple scales: compositional analysis tools and 
machine-learning algorithms can help to cope with the aforementioned 
challenges—in addition, developing and assessing measures of system-level 
reliability are essential for our understanding of the intensity of the cyberattack and 
how quickly (or whether) the damage can be remediated such that the CPS entity 
returns to some level of functioning—this process refers to cyber-resilience 
assessments. For example, Rodrigues et al. (2015) propose a compositional model 
capable of measuring reliability and modeling failure scenarios by composing 
models of its subcomponents. This allows efficient updates to the model, when new 
components are added or existing components are reconfigured or removed.   
Furthermore, network performance for CPS entities can be analyzed at different 
levels of granularity, where only parts of the system are considered. This helps 
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clarify the cyber risks of the system, specifically under the presence of a failure or 
cyberattack. Analyses at different scales can also be combined to produce aggregate 
measures of cyber risk and resilience, thus reducing the computational complexity 
of the analysis, enabling the parallelization of the computation of such measures 
and a more efficient updating of the analysis, when changes are observed in specific 
parts of the system. This kind of compositional analysis introduces a tradeoff 
among accuracy, level of granularity, and computational complexity. Since a gross 
modeling of the components of the system will reduce the computational 
complexity, the accuracy of the measurement of risk and resilience can be affected.  
For CPSs, it is also important for our cyber-resilience assessments to measure and 
forecast key cyber-risk characteristics, such as the timing and type of exploit and 
the number of successful cyberattacks. In this context, there exists visualization 
tools capable of providing representations of the attack paths an attacker can follow 
to compromise valuable assets in the system at different levels of granularity (Noel 
and Jajodia 2004; Noel et al. 2005). This granularity allows the user to manage the 
complexity of graph representations, in turn helping humans to better understand 
the levels of cyber risk. Muñoz-González et al. (2017) showed that approximate 
measures of risk in Bayesian attack graphs can be as accurate as exact analysis 
techniques, while imposing a lower computational burden. However, the 
compositional generation and analysis of attack graphs remains an open problem.  
Using attack graphs, the timing of lateral moves in a cyberattack can be projecting 
or forecasted—this type of predictive modeling is critical for cyber-resilience 
assessments (Yang et al. 2014). Attack graphs have also been valuable for 
computing the optimal cyber policy (Oldehoeft 1992) and control laws for 
implementation in cyber systems (e.g., IDSs, firewalls) for industrial control 
systems (ICSs)—security policies define the goals and elements of an 
organization’s cyber systems (Strapp and Yang 2014; Yang et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, using Poisson and negative binomial generalized linear models, 
Leslie et al. (2017) show that network security policy violations greatly influence 
cyber vulnerabilities for an organization or company’s network—specifically, the 
number of such violations is a strong predictor of the number of successful 
cyberattacks. In ICSs (e.g., power systems), resilient and robust controllers can be 
defined using discrete-time hybrid models that are based on value iteration and 
linear matrix inequalities, and these models have been used to study the effect of 
the IDSs’ cybersecurity policies on the ICS under a denial-of-service attack (Yuan 
et al. 2013). 
Another, more traditional way to test cyber resilience would be to engage a red 
team to measure mean time to recovery (MTTR) on a baseline of an infected system 
with no post-breach tools in use, then test again after introducing dynamic 
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solutions. A cross reference MTTR with a cost-benefit analysis of adding these 
tools would be a valuable maturity measure. 
Figure 8 outlines adaptive cyber-resilience mechanisms. 
 
Fig. 8 Adaptive cyber-resilience mechanisms 
Key cyber-resilience mechanisms are cyber deception, MTD or cyber agility, and 
clone defense—these processes provide dynamic CPS defense. Cyber deception 
works in networks, datacenters, cloud, supervisory control and data acquisition ICS 
systems, and the IoT. It is also capable of gathering forensics and reporting on the 
behavior of the attacker to understand its intent. It can easily scale as the 
dimensionality of the system grows. MTD is based on a simple premise that a 
moving target is harder to attack than a stationary target (Mellinger 2016). As a 
CPS gets more complex, the ability to implement a moving target solution gets 
more complicated to measure effectiveness. Clone defense is reverting to a point of 
a last known good state of the system. This can be accomplished from snapshots 
taken on a virtual machine or via a known good backup system. As a dynamic 
system (e.g., CPS, IoT) surges in size, the ability to revert to a known good state is 
demanding. 
Cyberattacks are frequent and are often stealthy, requiring CPSs and the IoT to be 
resilient to their intended affects.  Cyber-resilience approaches that are rules-based 
and static are insufficient for connected devices in dynamic, contested 
environments, where the cyber threats are difficult to predict. Instead, we need 
cyber-resilience assessments for CPSs and the IoT based on computational 
Adaptive cyber-resilience mechanisms. 
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algorithms and models that predict and forecast cyber-risk factors, such as 
identifying the targeted device (or host computer system) of a cyberattack, timing 
of the attack, and frequency of intrusions by type. In addition, examining the 
impacts of dynamic, strategic mechanisms for CPS defense—these include cyber 
deception, MTD, and clone defenses—can improve cyber resilience by adapting to 
dynamic exploit-vulnerability pairings in adversarial environments.  
7. Conclusion 
Much work remains in understanding the fundamental properties of cyber 
resilience. Cyber resilience is an increasingly discussed but as yet not well-
understood concept. One approach to enhancing and clarifying the concept is to 
identify connections between well-known concepts of information assurance and 
the resilience of an information system to attack. Well-formed properties must be 
time-independent, quantifiable, and calculated rather than measured. It is possible 
and useful to develop a mapping of categories of system properties to resilience 
objectives. 
Approaches to measuring and modeling cyber resilience should not be confused 
with those developed for risk. While both risk and resilience methods aim to 
strengthen a system against potential threats, they have different foundations; 
therefore, quantification of risk and resilience should be approached differently. 
Unlike risk models, resilience models aim to determine whether and how quickly a 
system’s critical functionalities can be restored given an unspecified event in order 
for the system to recover to a normal, functioning state. Cybersecurity networks are 
complex and interconnected networks in which known and unknown threats may 
impair the integrity of the system as a whole. If the structure of a network’s 
interconnections and critical functionalities is well understood, resilience models 
help simulate how each state of the network will be impacted by an attack and how 
cascading effects will influence the resilience of the whole system. While existing 
risk and resilience modeling approaches are implemented, advanced quantification 
tools should be further explored to develop a comprehensive understanding of how 
resilience modeling can help enhance cyber resilience. 
Modeling of a mission is critical to modeling and enhancing cyber resilience. 
Because of the challenges and costs of assessing and improving resilience across a 
military organization, such activities should be aligned to specific mission 
requirements. However, in the current state of practice, developing and continually 
maintaining mission models remains an expensive process. Such models should 
provide a framework that focuses resilience efforts on assuring missions and a 
mission-centric context for situational understanding in the face of cyberattacks. In 
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terms of strategic directions for future research and development, it is important to 
consider automated methods for building such dependency models, to help reduce 
costs. Because resilience in cyberspace is inherently a time-dependent problem, 
mission models need to incorporate the dynamic nature of mission dependencies 
and network environments. Furthermore, the modeling abstractions and levels of 
detail need to be driven by mission requirements. Standardization efforts in the area 
of mission models for cyber resilience can also help in reducing costs and 
improving modeling accuracy and consistency. 
Engineering-driven actions are necessary to develop more resilient systems by 
integrating cybersecurity/SSE to that of the well-known SE process. The Cyber 
Resiliency Engineering Framework developed by MITRE provides an overview of 
how to structure cyber-resiliency capabilities by addressing the goals, objectives, 
and practices in alignment with the “adversary activities” that occur within each 
capability to reflect the intent and potential actions that the capabilities are intended 
to protect. The mapping to the Cyber Resiliency Engineering Framework and the 
Start Secure, Stay Secure, and Return Secure concept are a useful starting point 
toward further development of a NATO cyber resilience-by-design capability. 
A particularly important path toward cyber resilience is implementation of dynamic 
defense. Uniform and static approaches are not useful for cyber resilience and risk 
assessments. Key cyber-resilience mechanisms are cyber deception, MTD or cyber 
agility, and clone defense—these processes provide dynamic defense. 
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List of Symbols, Abbreviations, and Acronyms 
C-BML Coalition Battle Management Language 
CMIA  Cyber Mission Impact Assessment  
CPS cyber-physical systems  
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol  
ICS industrial control system  
ICT information and communication technology  
IDS intrusion detection system  
imp  impact of the attack measured by the decrease of performance 
IoT Internet of Things  
LODs levels of detail 
MIA mission impact assessment  
MTD moving target defense  
MTTR mean time to recovery  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
OT operational technology  
SE  systems engineering  
SSE systems security engineering 
tfp  time to reach the final performance 
tip  time to restore the initial performance 
∆p  difference between the final and the initial performance  
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